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China’s monetary policy and the exchange rate1     
 
Abstract 
 
The paper models monetary policy in China using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor empirical reaction 
function. The feedback rule allows for reactions to inflation and output gaps, and to developments 
in a trade-weighted exchange rate gap measure. The investigation finds that monetary policy in 
China has, on average, accommodated inflationary developments. But exchange rate shocks do not 
significantly affect monetary policy behavior, and there is no evidence of a structural break in the 
estimated reaction function at the end of the strict dollar peg in July 2005. The paper also runs an 
exercise incorporating survey-based inflation expectations into the policy reaction function and 
meets with some success. 
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China’s monetary policy and the exchange rate 
 
 
Tiivistelmä 
 
 
Tutkimuksessa mallinnetaan Kiinan rahapolitiikkaa käyttämällä empiiristä hybridiä McCallumin -  
Taylorin reaktiofunktiota. Tämän säännön mukaan rahapolitiikka reagoi inflaatio- ja tuotantokuilui-
hin sekä kauppapainotetun valuuttakurssikuilun liikkeisiin. Tutkimuksen mukaan Kiinan ra-
hapolitiikka on keskimäärin mukautunut inflaation muutoksiin. Mutta valuuttakurssisokit eivät 
merkittävästi vaikuta rahapolitiikan asetantaan, eikä estimoidussa reaktiofunktiossa tapahtunut ra-
kenteellista muutosta tiukan dollarikytköksen loputtua heinäkuussa 2005. Tutkimuksessa myös si-
sällytetään kyselytutkimukseen perustuvia inflaatio-odotuksia politiikkareaktiofunktioon.  
 
Asiasanat: valuuttakurssi, hybridi McCallumin-Taylorin rahapolitiikan reaktiofunktio, SVAR, kyse-
lytutkimukseen perustuvat inflaatio-odotukset, Kiina 
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1 Introduction  
 
China’s emergence as a global power raises concerns about its economic policies. Monetary policy 
commands attention, since maintaining low inflation is crucial for social and economic stability. 
High inflation could erode the value of Chinese households’ large savings in domestic banks – 
broad money M2 amounted to over 150% of GDP in 2008. And China’s policymakers are also con-
cerned about sustaining rapid economic growth. Hence considering a central bank loss function in-
cluding inflation and output gaps, as in Svensson (1999), is likely to further our understanding of 
the conduct of monetary policy in China. But China’s institutional features, in particular the limited 
role of interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism, precludes estimating benchmark 
monetary policy reaction functions popular for analyzing more advanced economies. 
The paper models monetary policy in China using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction 
function (McCallum, 2000; Sánchez-Fung, 2005). The main question we seek to answer is: How 
does the People’s Bank of China react to developments in the economy, in particular to output, in-
flation and exchange rate gaps? In tackling that question, the investigation estimates reaction func-
tions to capture the monetary authorities’ adjustments of the monetary base in reaction to the vari-
ables of policy interest. The econometric modeling also estimates a reaction function incorporating 
a survey-based measure of inflation expectations. 
Discussions about China’s monetary policy have largely focused on the exchange rate, es-
pecially in the context of the 2007-2009 crises where the country’s dollar peg was thought to be im-
portant in feeding the global imbalances (Corden, 2009). That is why China’s decision of returning 
to a de facto dollar peg in the summer of 2008 generated criticism. In principle, the problem is that 
fixing the exchange rate renders domestic interest rate policy ineffective in the presence of full capi-
tal mobility. But China’s capital controls have been largely binding, so that determining the link 
between movements in the exchange rate and domestic monetary policy is an empirical matter. 
Previous studies use quantity-based rules in modeling China’s monetary policy, but the ul-
timate aim was different from the present study. Burdekin and Siklos (2008) examine whether Chi-
nese monetary policy could be modeled using a McCallum-type rule. They first compare the out-
comes for money growth in China to those suggested by the McCallum rule, and use the data for 
estimating the coefficients for the policy rule. Koivu et al. (2009) use a McCallum-type rule to fore-
cast inflation in China. Liu and Zhang (2007) used a quantity-based rule as part of a New-
Keynesian model to analyze monetary policy in China.  
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Zhang (2009) compares price and quantity rules in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium framework for China, and finds evidence that the impact of a price rule in the economy have 
become more important. He further argues that, when hit by shocks, following a price rule reduces 
volatility in the economy. But the policy rules examined in the study do not include the exchange 
rate as a target variable. Zhang (2009) also includes forward-looking inflation terms in the policy 
rules, but these are based on actual (instrumented) inflation outcomes rather than on surveys.   
We find that monetary policy in China has been procyclical in terms of reactions to infla-
tion. The finding matches the fact that accelerated reform policies have generally coincided with 
increases in bank lending and inflation pressures (Naughton, 2007). But there is evidence of stabi-
lizing policy via reactions to the output gap, and that may reflect the importance to the authorities of 
supporting economic growth and employment. Importantly, exchange rate shocks do not seem to 
significantly impact domestic monetary policy. The outcome probably reflects effective capital con-
trols, which have allowed for conducting a largely independent monetary policy in China. There is 
no evidence of a structural break, in terms of the estimated monetary policy reaction function, fol-
lowing the end of the strict dollar peg in July 2005.  
The paper also includes survey-based inflation expectations in the Chinese monetary pol-
icy reaction function. Using business surveys to evaluate the relevance of including forward-
looking elements in the estimated equations produces evidence of stabilizing policy in terms of in-
flation. But the finding is dependent on the measure of inflation expectations.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 specifies the empirical monetary policy reaction 
function, relating it to the specific features of China’s monetary policy and institutions. Section 3 
contains the econometric modeling of the benchmark reaction functions. Section 4 estimates an em-
pirical monetary policy reaction function including a survey-based measure of inflation expecta-
tions. Section 5 concludes. 
   
 
2 Specifying a McCallum-Taylor reaction function 
 
The paper models monetary policy in China using the type of hybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction 
function studied in Sánchez-Fung (2005) (see also McCallum, 2000). The central bank controls the 
growth of the monetary base Δb according to the following feedback mechanism  
 
 .  (1) 
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In equation (1)  is the output gap measured as the difference between actual and 
potential output;  is the inflation gap, i.e. the difference between actual inflation and the 
pre-announced annual inflation target. The gap  gives the nominal trade-weighted exchange 
rate’s deviations from a long-run trend path.  
The monetary base is the relevant instrument under the control of the policymaker 
(McCallum, 1988). Interest rates - only infrequently adjusted - have traditionally played a small role 
in China’s monetary transmission mechanism. The authorities announce a variety of interest rates, 
such as a bank lending rate, rediscount rate and benchmark rates for loans and deposits of different 
maturities. But overall the liberalization of interest rates has proceeded slowly.  
In contrast to the limited role of interest rates, intermediate annual money supply targets 
for M2 have been announced from the mid-1990s. The People’s Bank targets a level of the money 
supply so as to prevent inflation and deflation (PBoC, 2005). Reserve requirement ratios have been 
adjusted in order to control the money supply, together with open market operations in treasury 
bonds and central bank bills. The choice of instrument for analysis here corresponds with previous 
work on China’s monetary policy, e.g. Burdekin and Siklos (2008), Koivu et al. (2009), and Koźluk 
and Mehrotra (2009). Operating a fixed exchange rate along with strict capital controls has enabled 
implementation of a fairly independent monetary policy (e.g. Ma and McCauley, 2008). Majority 
state ownership of the banking sector arguably facilitates sterilization of capital inflows.
2
 Formal 
credit plans formed the basis of commercial bank lending until 1998. Window guidance policy con-
tinues to play an important role in Chinese monetary policy, which includes direct guidelines from 
central bank to commercial banks on lending to the money-holding sector
3
.  
The target variables on the right hand side of (1) are rationalized by the formal objectives 
of the People’s Bank of China. The announced objective of Chinese monetary policy is to “maintain 
the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth”.4 While the speci-
fication of a final target suggests that the value of the currency is important, promoting economic 
growth is in line with the Chinese government’s concern for providing sufficient employment and 
maintaining social stability. This supports inclusion of the output gap in equation (1). As an expand-
ing output gap may result in inflationary pressures, its inclusion is justified also on the basis of 
maintaining price stability.  
                                                 
2
 Liu and Zhang (2007) note that there have been persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity.  
3
 For a thorough description of China’s monetary policy see Geiger (2008); Evenett (2010) discusses China’s exchange 
rate policy.  
4
 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/huobizhengce/objective.asp 
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In estimating the output gap in China the analysis applies a Hodrick-Prescott filter to year-
on-year growth rates of industrial production, with a conventional smoothing parameter of 1,600.
5
 
Holz (2004) notes that China’s data collection is most advanced for the industrial sector. Industry 
covered 47% of China’s GDP both at the start (1994) and end (2008) of our estimation sample. 
There is also a strand of research related to the limitations and reliability of Chinese GDP statistics 
(Rawski, 2001; Holz, 2008). Recent important revisions to GDP data –in particular the 17% upward 
adjustment to its level in late 2005- have been due to corrections regarding the size of the service 
sector.  
China does not operate a formal inflation targeting regime, but annual targets for CPI 
growth are set by the Central Economic Working Conference. We employ that measure in con-
structing the inflation gap.
6
 For 1994-1997, targets were only defined for retail price inflation (RPI), 
a variable that is closely correlated with CPI inflation. For those years, CPI inflation targets are con-
structed using the announced RPI inflation target and adding the gap between actual CPI and RPI 
inflation for the previous year.
7
 The inflation gap has been negative during most of the sample, as 
actual inflation has fallen short of the target. Positive inflation gaps have been largely a temporary 
phenomenon, arising with demand pressures and high lending growth in 1994/95, and in tandem 
with food price pressures in 2004 and 2007/2008. Figure 1 displays the inflation gap together with 
the output gap, both series divided by their respective standard deviations. Some co-movement be-
tween the two series can be seen for 1994, 2004 and 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 While an industrial production series in levels is available in current prices, no deflator is published; hence our choice 
of year-on-year growth rates (in constant prices) for construction of the output gap. Moreover, during the reform period, 
Chinese economic cycles have been “growth cycles”, with slowdowns and upturns in growth rates but no fall in the 
levels series. 
6
 The data are from the China Monetary Policy Report, from 2001 onwards (various issues). The targets prior to 2001 
were obtained from the website of the National People’s Congress of China (only in Chinese, link available from the 
authors upon request).  
7
 For 1998, when both RPI and CPI targets were announced by the government, this procedure produces a CPI target 
equal to the officially announced target.  
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Figure 1  Output gap and inflation gap 
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Note: Both series are normalized by their respective standard deviations. 
 
The final gap in equation (1) is the exchange rate gap. China has tightly controlled the value of the 
yuan against the dollar, even after the strict dollar peg was disbanded in July 2005. The fixed ex-
change rate arrangement makes China different from some other transition economies (see e.g. 
Granville and Mallick, 2010, for evidence on the role of the exchange rate in Russian monetary pol-
icy). The existence of the strict peg during most of the sample ruled out use of the bilateral rate in 
the econometric modeling. The model produces the impacts of the trade-weighted nominal ex-
change rate, which is not an operating target, on China’s monetary policy. The rate is important 
from a policy perspective, as it captures imported inflation pressures and changes in competitive-
ness more extensively than a bilateral exchange rate. The exchange rate gap is defined as the devia-
tion of a trade-weighted exchange rate from its trend. This measure abstracts from the trend appre-
ciation affecting an emerging economy with rapid productivity growth and the ensuing Balassa-
Samuelson effect.  
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3 Estimating the monetary policy reaction function  
 
The research plan involves estimating a hybrid McCallum-Taylor policy rule using vector autore-
gressions (VARs). The strategy allows starting from a single equation specification by focusing on 
part of the estimated system and subsequently examining richer dynamics via an impulse response 
analysis. The starting point is a benchmark reduced-form vector autoregression:  
 
.     (2) 
 
In (2), the xt is a (K×1) vector of endogenous variables, the Ap are fixed (K×K) coefficient 
matrices, and ut is assumed to follow a K-dimensional white noise process with E(ut) = 0. A four-
variable VAR is estimated, including output gap , inflation gap , annualized quar-
ter-on-quarter change in monetary base , and nominal exchange rate gap . Applying an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test reveals that all the series are stationary: a unit root can be rejected for 
all series at the 10% level when the Akaike information criterion is used to determine lag length, 
and for the exchange and output gap a unit root can be rejected at the 1% level.
8
  Summary statistics 
for the variables are shown in Appendix A. 
The time series data are for 1994Q1 to 2008Q4, but estimations begin at 1994Q2, due to 
the use of first-differenced data for monetary base. Year 1994 is an important year in terms of re-
forms, as the former dual exchange rate system gave way to a single exchange rate framework, the 
fiscal system underwent a revamping, and policy banks were created to differentiate policy-related 
financing from commercially–oriented activities.  
The VARs include three lags, to allow for one full year of dynamics in the level of the 
monetary base, and estimate the system using ordinary least squares. The system includes a constant 
and a linear trend. The modeling process reduces the estimated VARs to a parsimonious system by 
sequentially eliminating all coefficients with t-values below the threshold of 1.00, at each step re-
estimating the system and deleting the coefficient with the lowest t-value. The resulting system, es-
                                                 
8
 When the Schwarz information criterion is used, a unit root can be rejected at 1% level for monetary base as well. De-
tailed results are available from the authors upon request.  
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timated with feasible generalized least squares, passes the major misspecification tests for autocor-
relation and ARCH effects.
9
  
 
The equation for the monetary base is the following (with standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
              (0.996)     (1.017)                       (0.115)            (0.839)           (0.121) 
 
 (3) 
  (0.888)                      (0.859)                        (0.121)    (0.902)                     (3.876) 
 
The estimated equation for the monetary base suggests that the People’s Bank conducts a 
countercyclical policy, leaning against the wind, in terms of the output gap: an increase in the out-
put gap leads to slower growth of the monetary base.
10
 But the result for the inflation gap is the op-
posite: inflation above the government’s target leads to an increase in the rate of change in mone-
tary base, suggesting that policy is accommodating increases in inflation.
11
 The latter finding is par-
allel to the argument by Naughton (2007) that demand for real resources has been accommodated 
by credit policy, which has then led to inflation. But as the inflation gap has been mostly negative 
during most of our sample period, inflation has not posed a problem for policy makers in China.
12
 
The reaction of monetary base growth to the exchange rate gap is accommodative: exchange rate 
appreciation leads to a fall in base money growth.  
How do the results look if we assume the existence of an interest rate rule and replace the 
growth in base money in the VAR by the People’s Bank of China’s benchmark one-year lending 
rate?
13
 The resulting equation for the interest rate in the VAR is as follows: 
 
                                                 
9
 The adjusted Portmanteau test for autocorrelation yields a test statistic of 253.24 (p-value of 0.14), and the LM test for 
autocorrelation with 4 and 1 lags amounts to 76.11 (0.60) and 9.24 (0.90), respectively. The multivariate ARCH-LM 
test yields a test statistic of 510.00, with a p-value of 0.37.  
10
 The result is obtained by calculating the long-run impact, i.e. adding up the lagged coefficients of the output gap.  
11
 Burdekin and Siklos (2008) find a procyclical response of monetary policy to movements in nominal GDP. However, 
they do not estimate policy reactions to movements in real output and inflation separately.  
12
 According to the International Monetary Fund (2003), both transitory and long-term supply shocks contributed to 
deflation in China in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
13
 Dai (2006) reports that the PBoC would have adopted interest rates as the intermediate goal in 2004. Nevertheless, in 
2009, intermediate targets for monetary aggregates and credit growth were announced by the PBoC. Furthermore, base 
money can be used as an instrument even with a change in the intermediate target by the monetary authority.  
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       (0.141)         (0.023)                      (0.137)         (0.028)  
 
  .   (4) 
   (0.012)                       (0.361)   (0.004)  
 
In addition to the statistically significant coefficients on lagged interest rates – suggesting important 
instrument smoothing – and the deterministic terms, only the coefficient on the inflation gap is sta-
tistically significant at the 10% level. Further, while its sign would actually suggest a countercycli-
cal policy response, the magnitude of the coefficient is small. The evidence shows that an interest 
rate rule does not provide an adequate description of monetary policy behavior in China, at least 
during the sample considered in the study. The finding is in line with the observation by Liu and 
Zhang (2007) that a standard Taylor rule does not capture China’s interest rate movements well dur-
ing 1992-2006. We therefore continue with the benchmark system with monetary base as the central 
bank’s instrument. 
The analysis examines the system’s dynamics by shocking the VARs and computing im-
pulse responses. If we do not want to take a strong stand on the contemporaneous restrictions to 
identify the system, we could in principle compute forecast error impulse responses (e.g., Breitung 
et al., 2004). This option creates similar dynamics, as suggested by equation (3), i.e. policy is lean-
ing against the wind in terms of the output gap and accommodative in terms of the inflation and ex-
change rate gaps.
14
  
However, the correlation matrix provides evidence against choosing forecast error impulse 
responses: the residuals appear contemporaneously correlated, and the correlations in many cases 
exceed , where T is the sample length. Under such conditions, shocks to the system would 
not happen in isolation. So the analysis opts for structural impulse responses with contemporaneous 
restrictions, in particular the AB model by Amisano and Giannini (1997). Denoting the structural 
form errors as εt and the reduced form disturbances as ut as before, the model  is written 
as 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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.    (5) 
 
where * denotes an unrestricted element.  
 
The structural shocks are an output shock , a price shock , a monetary policy shock  – de-
fined as a shock to monetary base - and an exchange rate shock . The structure of system (5) im-
plies that the effective exchange rate gap, being determined largely outside of China, is allowed to 
react immediately to any shock hitting the system. The assumption is reasonable as we are not using 
the bilateral USD-yuan rate that was stable during a major part of the estimation sample. The mone-
tary policy reaction function –corresponding to the second row in (5)– is constructed taking account 
of the policy maker’s information set. While information about the exchange rate is available im-
mediately, data on output and inflation gaps are only available with a lag.  
The output gap appears in the third row and is specified to react slowly to shocks hitting 
the system, possibly due to pre-determined consumption and investment expenditure, as in Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999). But the output gap reacts rapidly to exchange rate shocks, to avoid 
over-identifying the system.
15
 The inflation gap reacts slowly to shocks in output or the exchange 
rate. A slow response is in line with a standard Calvo-pricing scheme where prices are changed at 
exogenously determined random intervals (Calvo, 1983), or due to menu costs. There is a policy 
dimension to the inflation gap variable since it incorporates the government’s inflation target. So 
the inflation gap is allowed to react contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock. As there are 
K=4 endogenous variables, and K(K-1)/2 restrictions are necessary for exact identification, the sys-
tem (5) is just-identified.    
The structural model is estimated using the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form 
VAR, with a maximum likelihood estimator and scoring algorithm. Figure 2 shows the structural 
impulse responses 12 quarters ahead. The impulse response graphs show the path of monetary base 
growth following the various shocks. Appendix B shows the impulse responses computed using the 
system. In order to illustrate the uncertainty related to the parameter estimates, the graphs display 
                                                 
15
 Restricting the coefficient on the exchange rate shock to zero is not supported by the data, judging by the test on over-
identifying restrictions.  
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Hall’s 95% percentile intervals, obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications (Brei-
tung et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 2  Responses of base money growth to various shocks 
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The structural impulse responses partly confirm the results from the monetary base equation of the 
reduced form VARs: policy is accommodative in terms of an inflation shock and countercyclical in 
terms of an output shock. The latter finding supports the common perception about the importance 
of growth and employment for China’s policymakers. However, domestic monetary policy does not 
appear to be very responsive to movements in the exchange rate.
16
 This may be the result of rela-
tively binding capital controls, which provide leeway for domestic policy despite the fixed ex-
change rate, or the possibility to sterilize capital inflows without major implications for domestic 
interest rates.  
It is of interest to consider the robustness of the responses in Figure 2 to changes in the 
structure of the estimated SVAR model. In particular, we investigate the responses to shocks in a 
system with a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix and the following two 
orderings of the variables: {(y-y*), (π- π*), Δb, (e-e*)} and {(e-e*), Δb, (π- π*), (y-y*)}. The pro-
cyclical response to the inflation gap detected in the benchmark system remains when adopting the 
alternative models. With the first ordering, the response of policy to an output shock appears to be 
procyclical and with both orderings there is evidence of a procyclical policy response to the ex-
change rate. However, there is little theoretical support for the second ordering of variables.
17
   
The exercise also considers a five-variable VAR including the benchmark one-year lending 
rate: in this system movements in the monetary aggregate should be negatively correlated with in-
terest rates. In the reduced form equations, base money never enters the equation for interest rates 
with a statistically significant coefficient. The interest rate enters the equation for base money with 
a counterintuitive positive coefficient. It is difficult to identify shocks in the SVAR methodology 
including both base money and interest rates, as it is not clear how to simultaneously identify the 
(assumed) policy shocks. However, simple forecast error impulse responses indicate that there is no 
statistically significant impact of a base money shock on the interest rate. This result is expected 
given the limited role of interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism, especially in the 
earlier part of our sample. 
                                                 
16
 This finding is confirmed by examining the accumulated impact of exchange rate shocks on monetary base in levels 
instead of growth rates – there is no statistically significant impact on the level of base money. In contrast, structural 
shocks to output and prices have a statistically significant impact on base money in levels for several quarters.  
17
 The dynamics of the structural shocks do not need to seem identical to the coefficient estimates of the reduced form 
equations, as the structural shocks are identified by theoretical assumptions about the contemporaneous relationships 
between the reduced form errors. This explains why the policy reaction to the exchange rate gap is countercyclical in 
Eq. (2) but the response of base money to a structural shock in the exchange rate is largely insignificant in Figure 2.  
Aaron Mehrotra  and José R. Sánchez-Fung 
 
China’s monetary policy and the exchange rate                                  
 
 16 
We have also estimated the VAR with a different measure of the output gap. Instead of us-
ing data on industrial production, we have computed an output gap based on the growth rates of real 
GDP, with an identical methodology to the one described in Section 2. The SVAR impulse re-
sponses are similar to those obtained with the benchmark model: a price shock is met with a procyc-
lical policy response and the response to an output shock is countercyclical although statistically 
insignificant. An exchange rate shock is also met with a procyclical policy response when real GDP 
is used. We emphasize that the findings should be treated with caution, taking into account the ar-
guments in favour of the industrial production data in Section 2. The robustness tests provide evi-
dence of the procyclical tendencies of China’s monetary policy. Detailed results from all robustness 
tests are available from the authors upon request. 
During the sample period there was a major change in China’s exchange rate policy: on 
July 21, 2005 China announced that it was ending the fixed dollar peg, with a subsequent switch to 
a peg to a basket of currencies. Shortly afterwards the People’s Bank provided more information 
about the composition of the currency basket: the biggest weights were assigned to the US dollar, 
the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Korean won. Other minor currencies were also included. But 
actual policy strongly resembled a crawling peg from July 2005 until the summer of 2008, after 
which China has kept the value of the yuan stable against the US dollar.  
Frankel and Wei (2007) estimate that almost all weight on the currency basket was on the 
US dollar in 2005 and that the dollar’s weight was still “fairly heavy” in 2006.18 The investigation 
tests whether monetary policy setting in China experienced a structural break following the change 
in the exchange rate regime, by computing a Chow forecast test. Because Candelon and Lütkepohl 
(2001) show that the standard F-test leads to excessive rejections in samples of realistic size, the p-
values for the test are obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications.  
There is no evidence of a structural break in the exchange rate in the third quarter of 2005 
− the test statistic’s p-value is 0.51. Did the change in the exchange rate regime induce a slow 
change in domestic policy? The analysis tests for a possible structural break on every observation 
during 2005Q4-2006Q4. All resulting p-values are far above those normally considered standard for 
rejecting model stability. The lowest p-value obtained is for 2006Q1 (0.37). The analysis also runs 
the model until 2005Q2 and performs out-of-sample forecasts 10 quarters ahead. The approach pro-
vides an additional test for system stability.  
 
                                                 
18
 Recent estimates support an increasing weight on the euro in the basket, but since September 2008 almost all weight 
appears to again go to the US dollar (see Frankel, 2009, and 
http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/2009/03/11/the-rmb-has-now-moved-back-to-the-dollar/). 
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Formally, an h-step-ahead forecast is obtained as  
, (6) 
 
where  for j ≤ 0 and the 's (i= 1, …, p) are estimated parameters. 
 
Figure 3  Out-of sample forecast for base money growth (grey solid line) 
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Figure 3 shows that the actual observation for 2005Q4 (solid black line) is just on the borderline of 
the 95% confidence intervals (grey dashed lines), while all other actual observations for base money 
fall inside the confidence bands. This provides further evidence that the exchange rate reform has 
not entailed a structural change in domestic policy. That also supports the findings in the literature 
about the relative independence of Chinese monetary policy (e.g. Ma and McCauley, 2008; Liu and 
Zhang, 2007).  
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4 Monetary policy reactions and survey-based inflation  
expectations 
 
The previous analysis considers monetary policy reactions to current and past developments in the 
relevant variables, but does not explicitly include forward-looking terms. Given the empirically 
well-established lag between a change in the monetary policy stance – or a policy shock – and out-
put and inflation, including a forward-looking variable in a policy reaction function can be easily 
justified.
19
 However, the omission of explicit forward-looking terms does not imply that the hybrid 
rule would not allow for any forward-looking behavior in policymaking. Indeed, if an increase in 
output gap is expected to lead to inflation pressures with a lag, then by leaning against the wind 
with respect to output gap the central bank may be reacting to future inflation pressures. This may 
arise despite the fact that the coefficient on current and past inflation gap signal accommodative 
policy behavior.  
China’s surveys on inflation expectations are deficient in terms of sample length. The Peo-
ple’s Bank of China publishes a survey on inflation expectations, but the data are available only for 
the current decade. For that reason the paper employs a business survey on the price level of sales in 
5,000 principal industrial enterprises in China, compiled by the People’s Bank.20 The series reflects 
the firms’ judgments on price developments, including the prospects for the next few months. Most 
firms in the survey are state-owned large and medium-size enterprises, covering a total of 27 indus-
tries. The data are available for the entire sample.
21
 The survey is based on diffusion indices that are 
quantitative indicators constructed from qualitative answers by firms. The indices are obtained as 
the difference between qualitative answers indicating either an improving or a deteriorating outlook 
(an increase or a decrease in sales prices). As the index values range from -100 to +100, the survey 
does not produce an actual point forecast for the price level or inflation, but it does capture the per-
ceived and expected dynamics of sales prices. Figure 4 shows the inflation gap and the survey for 
price level of sales, with both series normalized by their standard deviations.  
 
 
                                                 
19
 Woodford (2000) discusses problems related to excessive forward-looking reactions in monetary policy.  
20
 The People’s Bank’s survey on inflation expectations is highly correlated with the business survey used in our study 
for 2001-2008 where both series are available (contemporaneous correlation coefficient of 0.83).  
21
 A possible alternative would be to use actual future outcomes for inflation and estimate a forward-looking reaction by 
GMM, as reported in Zhang (2009). However, our approach relies on surveys on inflation rather than a perfect foresight 
assumption.  
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Figure 4  Inflation gap and diffusion index on firms’ price level of sales 
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Note: Both series are normalized by their respective standard deviations. 
 
Given the difficulty of simultaneously identifying shocks both in terms of actual inflation and the 
survey-based measure in a SVAR framework, the modeling focuses on examining a reduced form 
equation similar to (3), but incorporating the first differences of the price level survey (πe). The 
model is estimated using ordinary least squares, eliminating coefficients with t-values below 1.00, 
and estimating the reduced model via feasible generalized least squares. The parsimonious equation 
for the monetary base is 
 
 
 (0.965)                (1.078) (0.114)           (0.861)         (0.123) 
 
               
(0.974)                            (0.433) (0.912)      (0.117)              (0.920) 
 
      (7) 
(0.488)                  (5.070)  
 
In equation (7), while the long-run coefficient on the inflation gap is still positive, the one 
based on survey data carries a negative sign, suggesting that the People’s Bank reacts to increases in 
inflation expectations via restrictive monetary policy. But in equation (7) the output gap carries a 
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positive long-run coefficient, which provides some evidence that the countercyclical output gap re-
sponse identified earlier in the paper actually captures a reaction to inflation expectations.  
The analysis considers an alternative measure of inflation expectations computed using an 
autoregressive univariate model of inflation. An AR(1) model, including a constant term, is esti-
mated as a rolling regression from 1994Q1-1998Q1 to 1994Q1-2008Q4, and at every observation a 
4-quarter-ahead out-of-sample forecast is produced. This AR-based measure of inflation expecta-
tions does not appear to be statistically significant for the resulting sample of 1998Q1-2008Q4.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The paper models monetary policy in China using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction function. 
The estimated reaction function allows feedback from developments in the output and inflation 
gaps, together with the effective trade-weighted exchange rate, using base money as the instrument. 
The analysis finds that Chinese monetary policy has been procyclical, reflecting an accommodative 
reaction to developments in the inflation gap. This is in line with the empirical observation that lib-
eralization policies in terms of reforms and regulation have coincided with increases in lending and 
inflation. But the reaction to the output gap has been countercyclical, whereas the money supply has 
not reacted significantly to developments in the exchange rate. 
The paper finds stabilizing policy behavior when using business surveys of price develop-
ments, suggesting that the People’s Bank of China reacts significantly to inflation expectations. The 
finding is consistent with the estimation of policy reaction functions in a general equilibrium 
framework, such as Zhang (2009), or in a three-equation New-Keynesian model, as in Liu and 
Zhang (2007). Similarly, the countercyclical response for the output gap probably reflects reactions 
to future price developments.  
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APPENDIX A 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Min Max Std deviation 
Inflation gap -1.233 -7.202 15.399 4.430 
Output gap 0.143 -3.775 7.165 1.908 
Base money 
growth 
14.989 -33.416 46.728 13.819 
Exchange rate gap -0.167 -4.116 5.726 2.324 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Impulse responses computed using the benchmark VAR 
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